Run-off elections: the process, scenarios and analysis
Introduction
On Sunday 19 October 2025 Bolivia will hold the second round (run‐off) of its presidential election held in August of this year. Back then, no candidate attained the threshold required to win the election outright. Tomorrow's run‐off pits two contenders: Rodrigo Paz Pereira (current senator, centrist) and Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga (former president, conservative). The outcome of this election is widely seen as pivotal as it will mark the end of more than two decades of dominance by the left‐wing Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and will open a new chapter in Bolivia’s politics and policy direction.
In what follows I will walk through how the day is organized, what voters can do and cannot do, where to follow results, who is up for election, their political stance, candidate profiles and their likely policies, voter expectations, legislative and sub‐national power distribution, and an analysis of governance challenges ahead as well as the significance of the results. There is a lot to cover, so here we go.
Briefly: What is the run‐off election and how did it come about
In Bolivia’s electoral system, a presidential candidate in the first round must secure either more than 50% of valid votes, or at least 40% and lead the runner-up by at least 10 percentage points in order to avoid a run‐off. In the 17 August 2025 first round, none of the candidates met that threshold. According to preliminary tallies, Rodrigo Paz secured roughly ~32% of the vote, and Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga about ~27% (official results are due later) among a crowded field of eight or more candidates. Hence, a second round (in Spanish ballotage) is triggered according to the law, scheduled for 19 October 2025.
This situation is historically significant in Bolivia: it is the first time in its recent democratic history that a run‐off will be required under this formula after so many years of MAS dominance under the former president Evo Morales and his successor.
How the day is organized: What voters can do and cannot do
On election day the following organisational and regulatory elements apply:
Can do
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Registered Bolivian citizens aged 18+ may cast a vote for their chosen presidential‐vice-presidential ticket.
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Voters will go to their assigned polling station (mesa de votación) where they will receive the ballot, mark it, and deposit it in the ballot box.
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After voting, they may leave the polling place once their act is complete.
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The official electoral body, the Órgano Electoral Plurinacional (OEP) provides the results‐tally online via its system (see below).
Cannot do
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They cannot vote twice or impersonate another voter.
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Election law often stipulates restrictions on campaigning, public gatherings, and electioneering on the day of the election or during the “hours of silence” (closing of campaign advertising) — typically starting the day before or early on election day.
There are restrictions on vehicle movement, sale and consumption of alcohol, or public demonstrations on election day for security reasons (common in Latin American contexts).
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Election institutions often forbid publication of partial results from a large number of polling stations (“exit polls”) until an authorized time.
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Voters cannot bring their marked ballot outside the polling station — chain of custody must be maintained.
Security and order
Given the national significance of this run‐off and Bolivia's historical experience with protests and irregularities during the electoral process, the day will likely be accompanied by elevated security measures:
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Police and security forces will deploy to polling stations and key public places to maintain order, deter intimidation and ensure free exercise of the vote.
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The electoral body and departmental electoral offices (in the nine departments) will coordinate with security services to guarantee the integrity of the process and safe transportation of ballots and materials.
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In prior Bolivian elections, such as 2019, concerns about disturbances, protests or irregularities were present; this time the OEP has announced the official result‐system will be active Sunday evening (somewhere around 20:00) on 19 October.
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At the departmental level, special attention will be paid in historical hot‐spots of protest (for example in Cochabamba, La Paz, PotosÃ) where previous large mobilisations have taken place. The departments’ gubernatorial offices and legislative assemblies may coordinate security operations.
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Observers (national and international) will monitor. According to Reuters, the 2025 election day in August had “few disruptions”.
The schedule
Here is a summary schedule for 19 October 2025 (and the relevant key times) as available:
| Time (Bolivia local) | Event |
|---|---|
| ~08:00 hrs | Polling stations open (typical standard time based on August first round) |
| 08:00-16:00 hrs | Voting window (note: in first round, polls closed at 4 pm in some places) |
| After 16:00 hrs | Polls close; ballots sealed and transported; counting begins. |
| ~20:00 hrs | Official result‐system by OEP becomes active. |
| Evening/Night | Media and electoral body release provisional results, updates. Observers release statements. |
| Following days | Final official results published by OEP, resolution of any appeals. |
Note: This schedule may include local variations by department (departamento) depending on terrain (rural/urban), weather, and logistics.
Where will the results be followed (web addresses)
For official and reliable information, one should consult:
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The OEP’s official results portal: https://computo.oep.org.bo/ (Sistema de Consolidación Oficial de Resultados)
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The main OEP website (for broader information and guidance): https://www.oep.org.bo
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Media outlets and live coverage.
In addition, departments may have their own departmental electoral websites for regional breakdowns.
Who is up for election
In this run‐off election on 19 October 2025 the main contest is for:
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President of the Plurinational State of Bolivia (five‐year term);
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Vice President (running on the same ticket);
The legislative elections (for the Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional — 36 senators + 130 deputies) were held on 17 August 2025 in parallel (first round) and their seats are already determined.
The two presidential tickets in the run‐off are:
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Rodrigo Paz Pereira (current Senator, representing the Christian Democratic Party – PDC)
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Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga (former president, representing the Libre/Alianza coalition)
The significance of this election in the country’s history
This election stands out for several reasons:
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End of an era: For roughly 20 years, the MAS party (under Evo Morales, and then Luis Arce) had dominated both the executive and legislative branches in Bolivia. This run‐off means for the first time in recent memory the presidency is directly contested between two candidates from outside that hegemonic formation.
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The first run‐off under the new context: Though Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution allows for run‐offs, this is one of the most high‐stakes uses of that mechanism signaling genuine change.
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Economic crisis as a backdrop: The country is confronting its worst economic conditions in decades — high inflation, scarcity of foreign currency and fuel, economic contraction. That context gives the election a profound significance for policy direction.
A turn to the center-right: The policy and politics is bound to veer towards the center-right, marking a historical turn from the left where two decades ago the MAS took the country's politics when it won support to govern the country.
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Legislative fragmentation: The results of the 17 August legislative vote point to a highly fragmented parliament (few or no majorities) meaning any new president will govern in a different political‐institutional environment.
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Geopolitical and resource stakes: Bolivia’s vast lithium reserves, energy resources and regional role make the elections important for external actors (investors, neighboring countries) as well as domestic constituencies.
Both candidates’ politics and expected policies
Here are profiles of the two contenders and their expected policy frameworks:
Rodrigo Paz Pereira
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Background: Son of former President Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993), born in exile in Spain, served as mayor of Tarija (2015-2020), and has been serving as senator since the last general elections in 2020.
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Political positioning: Centrist, with a reformist streak. He emphasizes renewal, anti‐corruption, private‐sector growth, and decentralization.
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Expected policies:
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A “50-50 economic model” he mentions, whereby the central government gives roughly half of public funds/competences to departmental/local governments (i.e., stronger decentralization).
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Support for private‐sector development, lifting import restrictions, credit access for low-income Bolivians.
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Anti‐corruption agenda, institutional reform; his running mate (Edman Lara) is noted for his social‐media savvy anti‐corruption stance.
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Risks / caveats: While he is a moderate, his policy proposals are still generic; the challenge will be translating them into governable programs in a fragmented legislature.
Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga
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Background: Former president of Bolivia (2001-2002) and long‐time politician, engineer by training.
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Political positioning: Conservative, pro‐business, free‐market friendly, seeks to reverse many MAS‐era statism.
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Expected policies:
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Aggressive economic reform: cutting public spending, reducing fuel subsidies, privatizing or closing inefficient state-run companies.
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Strengthening ties with the United States and Western institutions while re‐balancing away from China/Russia/“leftist” foreign alliances.
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Focus on security, modernisation of the police, combating narcotrafficking, and improving state efficiency.
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Risks / caveats: His agenda may face strong resistance from sectors opposed to deep austerity; Indigenous and rural constituencies may view his program as a rollback of pro-social/indigenous gains from MAS-era.
Comparative snapshot
| Issue | Rodrigo Paz | Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga |
|---|---|---|
| Economic model | Centrist market reforms + decentralization | Free‐market, austerity, privatization |
| State role | Moderate reduction of state centrality; stronger local govt | Significant reduction of state enterprises and spending |
| Social programmes | Retain social protections but with reform | Focus on efficiency, may reduce subsidies |
| Foreign policy | Balanced, engage private sector & global markets | Strong tilt toward West/U.S., change alliances |
| Governance style | Institutional reform, anti‐corruption, decentralization | Pro‐business, quicker reforms, smaller state |
What can people expect from a new president
Depending on who wins, the new presidential term (5 years starting November 2025) can be expected to focus on the following:
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Economic stabilization: Both candidates emphasize inflation, fiscal deficit, currency and fuel issues. The incoming president will need to stabilize macro-economics, restore reserves and confidence.
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Policy shift: A likely move away from the heavy-state model of MAS toward greater private sector, foreign investment, especially in resources such as lithium, natural gas and mining.
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Institutional reform & decentralization: With candidate programmes emphasizing anti-corruption, transparency, institutional checks and strengthening departmental/local government.
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Governance challenges: Given the fragmented legislature and weak majority, the president will need coalition‐building, likely negotiations across parties, possibly compromising key reforms.
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Social stability: The president will need to manage social expectations (especially from rural and urban indigenous sectors) and ensure that reforms do not trigger large‐scale unrest or backlash.
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Security & rule of law: With rising concerns about crime, trafficking, informal economy, the next government will have to prioritise security policy as part of economic recovery.
What are the expectations of voters for the candidate who wins
From what available polling and commentary suggest, these are some of the expectations held by voters:
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Change of direction: Many voters appear motivated by dissatisfaction with MAS’s record (economy, inflation, mismanagement) and want a meaningful departure.
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Economic relief: Respondents expect policies that will ease inflation, reduce cost of living, guarantee fuel/foreign‐currency access, improve household incomes and job opportunities.
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More inclusion & regional equity: Especially in departments that have felt marginalised, there is expectation for greater decentralization, more public investment, more departmental autonomy.
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Transparency & integrity: Given corruption scandals and institutional mistrust, many voters expect anti‐corruption and clean governance.
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Continuity of social gains: Even voters seeking change still hope that key social programmes (health, education, pensions) remain intact or improved.
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Safety and public order: Some sectors emphasize security, rule of law, combating trafficking and informal economy.
Who controls now the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies
The legislative results from the 17 August 2025 election produced a sharp realignment. It is important to remember however these are still preliminary results as the final official results still have to be approved and published by the OEP.
Seat distribution
According to the data:
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Chamber of Deputies (130 seats):
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Christian Democratic Party (PDC) ~49 seats (~32%)
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Libre (LIBRE/Alianza) ~39 seats (~26.7%)
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Unity (Unidad) ~26 seats (~19.85%)
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Popular Alliance (AP) ~8 seats (~8.39%)
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Autonomy for Bolivia РS̼mate ~5 seats (~6.64%)
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MAS – Instrumento PolÃtico (MAS‐IPSP) ~2 seats (~3.19%)
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Others (including Indigenous/Minor parties) the remainder.
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Chamber of Senators (36 seats):
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Christian Democratic Party (PDC) ~16 seats
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Libre – Liberty and Democracy ~12 seats
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Unity ~7 seats
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Autonomy for Bolivia РS̼mate ~1 seat
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MAS has essentially 0 (or extremely minimal) seats in the Senate in this election.
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Representation/distribution of power
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Chamber of Deputies (approximate)
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PDC: ~38%
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Libre: ~30%
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Unity: ~20%
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Others (AP, APB-Súmate, MAS, etc): ~12%
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Senate (approximate)
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PDC: ~44%
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Libre: ~33%
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Unity: ~19%
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Others: ~4%
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Interpretation
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No single party holds a majority in either house.
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The PDC is the largest party in both chambers, positioning its candidate (Paz) with a strong base in the legislature.
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The former hegemon, MAS, has been crushed, which is unprecedented in recent Bolivian history.
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Governance will require coalition‐building, negotiation and inter‐party alliances.
How does the power distribution look like at the departamento (department) level of government
The table shows that MAS has been able to govern comfortably in Cochabamba, Potosi and Oruro, as it controls the executive and the legislative.
Overall, however, the results show that people trusted more non-MAS candidates for governorship, where 6 out of 9 governors are non-MAS candidates.
To this we have to add that the assemblies have a strong MAS presence. Some of the undecided assemblies are basically divided between the opposition and the MAS where both sides are close to the simple majority and with the rest of the votes dispersed among smaller parties. This situation places a lot of leverage on these smaller parties. In many cases, these smaller factions are composed by the indigenous seats, and these often vote alongside MAS.
Also, it is important to remember that some of the said non-MAS candidates are indeed former MAS members.
At the local level, it seems power is the most dispersed. There are basically only three capital cities where the local power is controlled by one political force. These cities are: La Paz, Cochabamba and Tarija.
In all these three cities, MAS plays a moderate role because of the number of seats MAS candidates have attained within the councils. At the same time, many of these local councils are classified as undecided because the political forces do have presence but not one of them can claim the majority within the body.
Implications for departmental power distribution
Paz will encounter the most resistance at the departmental level of government. Three of the nine departments are dominated by MAS (or trifectas). Also, seven out of nine assemblies are dominated by MAS. The municipal level looks as though could be open to work with Paz, especially if he transfers more tasks and finances towards the municipalities and regions.
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Departments where Quiroga leads may or may not become points of contention or rivalry with a Paz presidency (and vice versa) depending on how strongly the current political leaders feel aligned with either one of the candidates.
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The fragmentation at departmental level suggests the possibility of split governance: one party controlling the national presidency, while others control departmental governments (governor + assembly).
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Because departments vary by region (Andean, Amazon, lowland) and by socio‐economic profile, the governance challenges will differ: e.g., Andean highland departments emphasise mining/resources and Indigenous rights; lowland departments emphasise agribusiness, natural gas, Amazon conservation.
Analysis: How will all the levels of government — national and departmental — have to govern in order to bring the country forward
The new political configuration in Bolivia presents both opportunities and challenges for governance:
Opportunities
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Fresh mandate for reform: With public appetite for change, a new administration may initially have legitimacy to push structural reforms.
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Weaker party dominance: With MAS weakened, there is greater room for pluralist politics, negotiation and institutional checks.
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Greater departmental autonomy: Candidates’ emphases on decentralization may open up opportunities for departments and municipalities to assert more control, tailor policies to local realities, and reduce over‐centralisation.
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Resource mobilisation: A new government may unlock investment in key sectors (lithium, gas, mining) that were stalled, thereby boosting growth.
Challenges
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Fragmented national legislature: With no majority, the president will have to negotiate across parties; coalition fragility may hamper bold reforms or lead to slow implementation.
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Divergent departmental agendas: If departments are aligned with different national parties (or oppose the national government), coordination may be weak, leading to policy fragmentation or turf wars.
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Economic crisis magnitude: The next government inherits a deep economic crisis (high inflation, reserve shortages, fuel scarcity). Even the best policies take time; public patience may be short.
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Social and indigenous expectations: Many social programmes and indigenous rights expanded under MAS; a shift toward liberal market reforms risks alienating these groups unless handled carefully.
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Institutional deficits: Weak institutions, administrative capacity limitations, corruption legacies and geographic dispersion (especially rural/remote departments) mean that policies may not easily translate into delivery.
Strategy for governing
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The incoming president and his government will need a dual strategy:
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Immediate measures to stabilize economy and reassure markets/social sectors (e.g., currency, inflation, fuel).
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Medium‐term institutional reform to decentralise, modernise state, strengthen rule of law and enable productivity growth.
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At the departmental level, governors and assemblies will need to collaborate with the central government (via fiscal transfers, joint projects) but also adopt innovation in local governance, service delivery and mobilization of private investment.
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Cross‐level coordination mechanisms (national–departmental commissions, inter‐governmental councils) will be essential to align policies, avoid duplication, and ensure tapering of central dominance.
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Political dialogue and building of coalitional support across parties and regions will be essential to pass legislation, budgets and reforms. Without that, gridlock is likely.
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Transparent communication will also matter: managing expectations, being clear about timelines, risks and trade-offs will help sustain legitimacy.
In effect, what is required is an era of “governance by inclusion and reform” — rather than governance by one party‐dominance. The political shift demands robust institutional architecture and coordination across levels (national↔departamento) to translate electoral change into societal change.
Deepening the governance & policy‐scenario mapping
Here I map out how national and departmental levels could interact in the next term, under different scenarios, and what policy implications follow.
Scenario A: Candidate Paz wins the presidency
National level: Paz takes office, emphasises decentralisation, institutional reform, private sector growth.
Departmental level: Departments in which Paz has strong support (e.g., La Paz, Oruro, PotosÃ) may become collaborators: receiving favourable transfers, participating in joint programmes, etc. Departments where Quiroga leads (e.g., Santa Cruz, Pando) may either cooperate (if incentives align) or become opposition hubs.
Governance implications:
Opportunity to pilot “50-50 model” of revenue sharing between national and departmental governments (as in Paz’s platform).
Need to build a national-departmental coordination framework: e.g., inter‐governmental council, joint budgeting.
Risk: If opposition‐led departments block national initiatives (e.g., infrastructure, resource regulation), implementation may stall.
Social policy: Paz may seek to adjust large subsidies or social programmes but retain visible protections; departments will have to deliver locally‐tailored services (education, health, transport) – departmental legislatures become key.
Resource policy: Lithium, gas, mining exploitation often lie within departmental jurisdictions; successful extraction and revenue sharing will hinge on national-departmental cooperation, possibly special agreements with departmental governments.
Security & rule of law: National government likely to emphasise strengthening police, combating trafficking; departments will need to align local law enforcement resources and budgets.
Scenario B: Candidate Quiroga wins the presidency
National level: Quiroga leads with free‐market, austerity, privatisation agenda.
Departmental level: Departments that strongly backed Quiroga (Santa Cruz, Pando) may be strategic allies; departments that supported Paz may adopt more cautious/defensive stance.
Governance implications:
National government may push for rapid structural reforms—privatizations, subsidy cuts, liberalization. Departmental governments may face backlash if social services are cut; strong departmental leadership will be required to manage local protests and social mobilization.
Resource policy: With an economic liberalization thrust, national government might seek to open resource sectors (e.g., lithium) to international investors. Departments will be key gatekeepers for local permits, environmental licensing, land rights. If departmental governments are oppositional, resource policy may become contentious.
Decentralisation: Quiroga’s agenda may prioritise efficiency over full decentralisation. Departments may resist if they perceive erosion of their autonomy or cuts in transfers.
Social expectations: Voters in departmental strongholds may expect rapid improvements; if not delivered, local dissatisfaction may emerge. Departments will need to actively manage local expectations and tailor social programmes.
Cross‐level governance themes regardless of winner
Fiscal transfers & budgeting: The national government’s ability to deliver reforms will depend strongly on flow of funds to departments, and departmental governments’ ability to use funds effectively. Weak departmental capacity may hamper outcomes.
Institutional capacity: A key bottleneck is administrative capacity at departmental and municipal levels; many rural / remote departments have logistical, human-resource limitations. The national government may need to invest in capacity building.
Political negotiation: With no clear majorities in the national legislature (see previous post), department‐level parties may become critical coalition partners. Governors/department assemblies may link with national factions, influencing national policy.
Regional inequalities: Departments differ markedly in wealth (e.g., Santa Cruz is a powerhouse; Potosà poorer). If reforms benefit some departments more than others, spatial tensions may arise. The new national government will have to manage equity across regions.
Social and ethnic dynamics: Departments with large Indigenous populations (La Paz, Oruro, PotosÃ) will expect that rights, languages, land claims continue to be respected. If national reform agenda is seen as threatening, there may be departmental resistance or mobilisation.
Security and conflict management: Departments may serve as flashpoints (e.g., resource conflicts, coca‐leaf cultivation zones). Coordination between national and departmental security forces will be required.
Resource governance: Many important natural-resource sites (minerals, gas, forest) lie in departmental territories. National policy must engage departmental governments and local communities to ensure legitimacy, revenue-sharing and environmental/societal safeguards.
Recommended “governance checklist” for the new term
For the incoming administration (and their allied departmental governments), the following checklist would help improve chances of success:
Establish a national-departmental coordination council (with governors, departmental assembly presidents, national ministers) within first 100 days.
Map transfer/trust flows from national to departmental budgets: clarify transparency, timelines, accountability.
Prioritise “fast-wins” in service delivery (health, roads, internet) in select departments to demonstrate reform-momentum.
Negotiate departmental autonomy packages: define what functions remain national, which are departmental, and share resource revenues equitably.
Invest in departmental capacity building: training local administrators, improving procurement, ensuring financial audits.
Align resource‐rich departmental policies: laws/regulations for mining/lithium/gas should include departmental participation, local community rights, revenue sharing.
Maintain inclusive social policy safeguards so that vulnerable departments (high-Andean, Amazon) are not left behind.
Engage in legislative coalition-building: leverage departmental parties to support national legislation; avoid governance gridlock.
Prepare for political backlash or opposition in departments: in departments where the national‐opposition coalition won, expect potential resistance—deal with it via dialogue, incentives, not just pressure.
Communicate early and clearly with citizens in all departments: explain reform timelines, trade-offs, who will benefit, and how decentralization will improve local outcomes.
Conclusion
The 19 October 2025 presidential run‐off in Bolivia is more than just another election: it is a watershed moment. Facing a grave economic crisis, institutional fatigue and deep public desire for change, Bolivia is poised to move into a new phase of its political life. The contestants — Rodrigo Paz Pereira and Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga — offer distinct trajectories for the country: one centrist, decentralising and reform‐oriented; the other conservative, pro‐business, and market‐driven.
Yet regardless of who wins, the incoming government will face immediate and profound challenges: a shattered economy, a fragmented legislature, a legacy of centralised rule and institutional weaknesses, and high public expectations. Success will depend heavily on how skillfully the new administration navigates coalition politics, coordinates across national and departmental levels, delivers early results, and sustains institutional reforms.
For readers following this election, the key dates and websites (OEP’s results portal) are critical. Also of importance will be how the dynamics at the departmental level evolve: governors and local assemblies will play a larger role than perhaps in previous eras.
In historical terms, this election may mark the end of one dominant political pattern and the beginning of a more pluralistic, negotiated, multi‐actor governance model in Bolivia. Whether that model delivers meaningful change remains to be seen—but the expectation and opportunity are very real.
