The Luis Arce Government: a New Beginning or More (MAS) of the Same?

Bolivia Today © 

Once again Bolivia finds itself at, what seems to be an all too familiar place, the threshold of change. This time however, it remains to be seen if it will be a new beginning or more of the same. 

Bolivians learned late Sunday night (October 18) that what looked to be a close election was in fact a replay of prior elections. Luis Arce, presidential candidate for MAS, the party that has been ruling Bolivia for the last 14 years, seemingly against significant odds won again the electoral vote with a whopping 55 percent. The second place Carlos Mesa, candidate for CC, a leading figure in the ousting of Morales, and on whom many people had rested their hopes, only managed to achieve 28 percent of national support. 

The results were received by MAS supporters with exaltation, while Arce showed no surprise and perhaps a tick of overconfidence. On the other side, voters supporting the opposition were mostly shocked by the overwhelming result. A mix of sobering and confused attitudes instead could be observed among the opposition candidates. In fact, most of them, including Mesa, had accepted the results by late Monday, October 19. The results were so clear that no one dared to challenge them. Only, what seems to be a small group of disgruntled anti-MAS voters, has been showing up on the plazas and town halls to demonstrate against the results.

With the votes having been painstakingly counted, the results having been officially certified and the winner having been reluctantly but convincingly announced, the new/old MAS government, led by former economics minister now president-elect Luis Arce, is set to take office on November 8, 2020.

The official results are in and now we can turn our attention to try to explain how or why and, above all, try to take a look into the future or explore what will happen between 2020 and 2025.

1. What happened?

The day after the election was dominated by headlines showing, with more astonishment than credibility, Arce winning the race by a margin of more than 20 percentage points. Now experts begin the arduous task of making sense of what happened. Here are my two cents.

There are at least two reasons to consider if we want to explain why MAS won with such a large margin: the undecided vote and the political ambitions of a newcomer. The first reason inevitably takes me to consider those voters who in earlier posts where I analyzed the polls I categorized as undecided and nobody. The first category referred to those voters who were not yet decided for whom they would vote and the second category referred to those voters who did not want to say for whom they will vote, i.e. to a question asking them for whom will they vote they would answer "for nobody". 

Looking back at the numbers in my post on October 12 (update 5), the total percentage given by the sum of the average of all polls for the undecided and nobody categories was still reaching over 22 percentage points. Now, from the official results we can see the difference (26 percent) between Arce (55 percent) and Mesa (29 percent) is very close to the size of the combined undecided and nobody intention estimates. This means a difference of 4 percentage points, well in the range of error margins. In addition, in the final count, the number of blank and void votes was reported to be some 5 percent. Hence, accounting for the error margin and the number of blank and void votes, the possibility that these undecided and nobody voters, in the end, decided to vote for Arce is very plausible. I think this sort of thing happens more often than we want to accept.

The explanations as to why these voters voted as they did are several. In one post I even speculated that these voters indeed knew well for whom they would vote but they just did not want to divulge it to the polls. I highlighted this aspect because it reminded me of the notion in current US politics where some analysts and pollsters observed voters who do not want to say they will vote for Trump. Analysts and pollsters termed these voters as "shy" and the phenomenon as shy voter phenomenon. The interpretation points to the fact they fear social consequences so they simply do not volunteer their real intention to vote for him. Now, while in the American case might not be speculation anymore, in the Bolivian case is still very much speculation. 

If we keep in line with that theory, we can assume the Bolivian undecided and nobody voters did not want to say for whom would they vote. Interpretations here range from, some might have felt shame because the MAS was just making very bad headlines all along, above all because of the electoral fraud in October 2019. Others might have decided not to answer and keep the pollsters in the dark. It could also be that this was a strategy all along to beguile the opposition. Difficult to imagine, but entirely possible in a highly organized, corporatist structure such as MAS. Let us not forget the MAS is at its core an alliance of many groups and organization (social, labor, ethnic, movements, etc.). Each one of these organizations is more or less organized on a horizontal as well as vertical manner, where the horizontal refers to groups inside the organization and the vertical structure refers to largely geographical entities such as community, municipality, neighborhood, region, province, department, etc. What happens in this organizations gets easily transported up or down and sideways inside the organization. Such structure, which Bolivians call organic, makes it also close and thus easy to control. So, a strategy can easily be conceived, transposed, followed and kept quiet along these lines.

Another plausible explanation for the undecided voter factor is the argument about ethnic divisions which is significantly related to the rural versus urban divide in the country. According to the National Statistics Institute (INE) Bolivia is an urbanized country, with the large majority (around 70 percent) of its citizens living in urban areas, especially in La Paz/El Alto, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. The INE also shows that more than 65 percent of the people identify themselves as indigenous. Confronted with those facts, it is possible for us to conclude that the majority of Bolivians are of indigenous descent and therefore would in theory support the advancement of ethnic political interests. It would also be sensible to conclude that if more people live in urban areas, there are less possible barriers to vote. For example, in the country side there is traditionally less infrastructure and the polling places are further away.

Following this line of though, is plausible that the majority of the undecided and nobody voters were of indigenous origin and since most of them lived in urban areas, they had the capacity to have more of an impact. This is relevant because if we assume all that, it would also be sensible to assume the same voters were supporting MAS. After all, the MAS is considered by the indigenous majority the political instrument for the people's sovereignty (the official MAS acronym is MAS-IPSP, Movement Towards Socialism - Political Instrument for the People's Sovereignty).  

That, of course does not take into account the countless of Bolivians who do not identify themselves as indigenous, but nevertheless are of indigenous descent. Some reasons for not taking an indigenous identity include people who live in cities only, people whose first language is Spanish, or people of mixed race. But this does not exclude them supporting MAS.

The other reason why MAS won this way can be of course attributed to Fernando Camacho (Creemos). The final results show Camacho obtaining 14 percent of the vote at the national level. If we add Mesa's and Camacho's percentages we get 43 (1 percent give and take). Now, according to the math this would not have been enough to reach that less than 10 percent difference objective to force a second round of elections, but who knows. The calculation assuming Camacho quitting the race included the possibility that some undecided voters in Santa Cruz and Beni actually decided to vote for Mesa. Let us remember that the East or the low lands, as Bolivians call this region, is and has been opposition to the MAS government. That could have meant reaching the less than 10 percent threshold. The outcome of that calculation aimed at arriving at what every poll that considered the second round election question was predicting, that Mesa would win it.

Now, based on real politik it is not possible to blame Camacho for making a different calculation. His strategy was obviously regional in scope because he knew he had large support in the Eastern departments. His strategy called for participating in the elections even if it meant MAS was going to win the elections. Camacho's clear aim was to build a sizeable faction within Congress. With that he assured the participation of a regional block which was surely going to press regional agendas. Had he quit the race, his political alliance would have lost every chance at seating at the table. The region would have just had to rely on the regional faction within CC. 

Now, of course, there are a number of other reasons offered to explain why MAS won. To start of, there is the opinion that the MAS still has its apparatus in place and that too many people are benefiting from it for them to want to change anything. That indeed is another plausible explanation which takes into account the actual size of the government (at all levels) as well as the rest of people benefiting from lending public support for MAS in the form of demonstration attendance, gatherings and the like. Others still point to racial disparities among indigenous and non-indigenous people. One thing is for sure, many people see the MAS as a political force by and for the indigenous people. In defining moments in history, this all encompassing objective tends to unite all those who feel the interests of indigenous people are embodied by the MAS.

2. What now?

Luis Arce will be sworn in on November 8, 2020. He has run his campaign on the promise to keep the course of the last 14 years. Arce is yet to announce his cabinet, but speculations about people from the Morales government joining his government are causing anxiety in the large cities, where most of the opposition lives. Groups of people, e.g. in Santa Cruz the cruceno youth organization, has been demonstrating and taking some measures to politically back their claim there was electoral fraud. Similarly, in Cochabamba, another youth grass roots organization has been demonstrating, as in La Paz, several grass roots organizations. However, these seem to be isolated groups.

As part of his more of the same campaign, Arce is currently preparing for the so called "transition". His team is working on taking over the government from the current care-taker government. Therefore, we do not know too much about who will be joining his cabinet, nor we know much about who will be joining the rest of his government.

One thing we have been able to understand much more based on his comments is Arce's economic plan. He has said it will be based on what the MAS has been doing so far, namely deepening the so called process of change (for more on that please see prior posts).

Domestic demand: He wants to re-activate domestic demand through monetary transfers, specially the bonus system already in place. To that he said he will add an additional bonus called the "bonus against hunger" (Bs. 1000). Arce said "we must introduce however many bonuses necessary to activate domestic demand" (Interview, Cadena A, Noches Sin Tregua, October 20, 22:22).

Domestic production: Arce wants to stimulate domestic production, both in the already existing public companies and some other companies that might be created. His short-term plan is to implement an import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy, mainly producing agricultural products (for domestic consumption and export) and stimulating domestic tourism. His medium to Long-term plans include the industrialization of lithium and related industries (he says 41), the creation of a steel industry in the Mutun area in Santa Cruz, and eventually export electricity to neighbor countries. Of course, he plans to deepen what he calls the industrialization of natural gas and related industries.

Public investment: Finally, Arce is keen on keeping the government at the center of economic activity. His economic model views the state as the motor of the economy. His favorite policy is public investment.

In Congress, MAS took measures to keep its control. The fact that MAS won the presidency with majoritarian support only, rather than keeping its 2/3 majority would have left MAS with the necessity to negotiate with the opposition in a more intense manner. In presidential systems the 2/3 rule is often needed to force the majority party to negotiate with the opposition in certain issues. Of course, if you have 2/3 control of the chambers (as Morales did), you do not need to negotiate.

Being aware of the above, the MAS in Congress laid the ground for continued control of the legislative before they closed the current congressional session. Both chambers have modified their internal rules. The MAS majority eliminated the 2/3 majority rule which was needed to appoint diplomats or approving military appointments or reprimanding ministers. Instead, it changed that requirement to a simple majority. That way, in the name of "governability" the MAS will not need the 2/3 majority anymore to keep controlling Congress, since it will have a majority. 

In addition, to those more technical changes, the MAS has decided to start a number of legal actions against current government officials charging them with a range of crimes from corruption to negligence to even mass murder. Current government officials are set to face a justice system largely perceived as biased towards MAS.

As for the opposition, in my opinion, it is still as divided as ever and it seems it will be toothless as it has been in the last decade. Mesa and Camacho do not seem to understand each other nor do they seem to want to work together. Camacho has ran with the objective of replacing all politicians, who he considers unfit to govern. It remains to be seen if the rest of the Creemos deputies and senators, many of whom are old politicians, will want to adopt Camacho's approach or will they fall back to old ways of conducting political business. 

What does seem clear is that Camacho does control the opposition in Santa Cruz and Beni and will be setting the regional agenda more decidedly, both at the regional and national levels of government. Mesa, seems to have a good grip on the south, namely in Tarija. However, it does not seem as deciding as Camacho's grip. As such, it seems to me, with this observation, the reality of a geographical division within the opposition is highly visible.

3. What is coming?

One thing taking already the attention of many is the coming Subnational elections. That is how Bolivians call the elections for the lower levels of government in the departments and municipalities. These levels of governments, as it is in many federal systems, in Bolivia are also an important political factor. Even though, the level of autonomy at the regional and local levels is not what it once was, the departments and municipalities still play a significant role at the time of creating employment, stimulating the local economy, negotiating for more funds stemming from the export of minerals, building infrastructure, etc. Therefore, whoever wins the governorship in each department and the mayoralty in each municipality and what party controls each of the assemblies and councils is of major importance. If we learned from the extant experience, the opposition controls several important departmental and municipal government, which has not made it easy for the former Morales government to implement its policies as one might have imagined.

One other factor to take into account is the future relationship between President Arce, former President Morales and his federation of coca growers. The Arce-Morales relationship will be a decisive factor to the extent that Arce can control Morales as well as the powerful six coca growers' federations behind Morales. Another group Arce needs to bring under control is Morales' loyal lieutenants members of his former government. If we can judge that relationship based on who escaped last year on the plane together with Morales, it can be said that the relationship was not as close as it seemed. But, the fact that Arce was one of the few ministers holding on to his office for the entire Morales era should not be ignored. I think they have a good relationship, not close, but good.

A potential factor of conflict, in my opinion, are the demands (or expectations) of the MAS' bases. At the moment we are observing, for example, various founding groups demanding they be granted an almost unreal number of ministries. If I am not mistaken, these requests exceed 100, and considering there are only a limited number of ministries, these requests have the potential to escalate conflicts within the organization. And if we enter the field of speculation, I would say that this is the factor with the most potential for conflict. If Arce fails to consolidate his leadership in the party, as Morales did and still does, these different groups in the MAS will challenge Arce to the last consequences and perhaps play Morales against Arce in the long run. Morales may very well play a central role in these developments.

Lastly, another factor that I see coming is the economic crisis looming around the world, the region and the country. Arce will face a very different country than the one Morales inherited when he took over government. His presidency coincided with a period of economic expansion in the region carried on the back of the high prices of raw materials. In simple terms, the economic environment was very propitious. Even during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the Latin American region grew at a decent pace. Bolivia did very well. Now the country will face a hostile environment with the effects of the pandemic, the prices of raw materials in low levels, the debt increasing by gigantic steps, the deficits deteriorating more and more, etc. In this economic environment, Arce will have to make very difficult decisions, which perhaps contradict the policy of the MAS in the Morales era.

4. Conclusions

Luis Arce and MAS won decisively at the national level. They have a commanding lead and more legitimacy than they needed. Only time will tell if Arce is able to consolidate his control of the party and thus implement his agenda. Only time will tell if Morales is willing to retire and bring advice only to this new government. One thing is sure, the opposition is still divided and therefore weak to confront a MAS government. Moreover, at the regional and local level, politics will be decided next year. The success or failure of this government depends somewhat from these results.

Sources:

https://www.la-razon.com/nacional/2020/10/27/el-senado-hace-cambios-en-su-reglamento-y-anula-los-2-3-para-aprobar-ascensos-y-embajadores/